5.3.1 Creative Processes (continued)

In addition to asking about origins, one might also ask about differences between the products of creative processes. Does the particular product or the domain in which creativity occurs affect the process itself, just as different children or different species may develop at different rates and perhaps go through unique series of stages? Although several authors claim that creativity is domain‑specific, there are some claims for universals in creativity, as there are for development and evolution. Thus, several general characteristics of creative thinking, regardless of domain, have been proposed.

For example, creative thought processes, regardless of the problem on which they are focused, are claimed to involve the following: transformations of the external world and internal representations by forming analogies and bridging conceptual gaps; constant redefinitions of problems; applying recurring themes and recognizing patterns and images of wide scope to make the new familiar and the old new and nonverbal modes of thinking.

In addition to time requirements, some element akin to insight, and the generality of processes across domains, a further issue on which several authors agree is that different levels of creative expression may occur. Although not all authors have addressed the levels issue explicitly, the general belief is that the processes responsible for varying levels of creativity may differ, if not in kind, at least in degree; see Feldman for a more detailed discussion. Thus, both within a domain and within the same individual at different points in time, there may be differences with respect to the amount of creative processing in which individuals engage. Einstein, in this view, may have attained a high level of creativity, or often have engaged creative thought processes, whereas a less influential scientist in his time may not have achieved such a high level, or simply did not apply creative processes to the same extent that Einstein did. Different levels of creativity may exist, therefore, in an analogous fashion to the idea that species differ in their complexity along the phylogenetic scale. However, this issue of levels brings up yet another area of controversy: the availability and accessibility of creative processes, both between and within individuals.

First, let us address the availability question, as it pertains to different individuals. Creativity, according to some authors, occurs only in special individuals (the Edisons, Einsteins, Freuds, Mozarts, and Picassos of the world) at rare moments in time. Other authors believe creativity to be a much more normative process, available to every thinking instrument ‑ adult expert, growing child, or programmed computer. Thus, creative processes can be trained and improved, as far as Langley and Jones, Schank, Taylor, and Torrance are concerned, because their concept of creativity is in line with this latter, “available‑to‑everyone” view. Training is not an easy matter, however, according to the theories of authors such as Barron, Csikszentmilialyi, Gruber and Davis, and Hennessey and Amabile, who maintain that creativity is achieved only when the “right” combination of particular problems, skills, individual, and social milieu comes together.

Finally, there is controversy over the accessibility of creative processes within individuals. Disagreement on the accessibility issue ensues when the role of the unconscious and semiconscious elements in creative processing are brought up. As with insight, the expression of the unconscious is sometimes conceived of as the key to creativity (Feldman; Torrance). Thus, creativity, according to these authors, is accessible only by bringing unconscious elements into conscious awareness. In other views, however, the role of the unconscious and the question of accessibility are ignored completely. Once again, the consensus lies in between, with unconscious elements existing and being important for creativity, but not the essence of creative thought processes. Langley and Jones, for instance, provide a particularly interesting discussion of the unconscious in the memory‑activation processes. In the Langley and Jones proposal, the memories relevant to a creative insight are not accessible until just the right cue activates them. Thus, they propose that such unconscious processes are involved in, but are not central or unique to, creativity.

The issues addressed when one considers creative processes, therefore, include the following: the time required for such processes; the role of insight and the sparks that set off creative thinking; how closely processes are tied to their products; general characteristics of creative thought across different domains; levels of creative processing; the need for the products of such processes to be unique in order for them to be labelled as creative; and how accessible and controllable the processes are in conscious awareness.